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INTRODUCTION
The problem of maintaining a sound relationship between municipal develop-
ment and the local budget was again brought to the foreground in the recent case
of Beach v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Milford.' The planning officials
of Milford, Connecticut, had denied a property owner permission to subdivide his
land on the grounds that the fire and police protection and school facilities which
would be demanded by the increase in population in that area could not be furnished
at that time in view of the community's financial condition. The Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors overruled this action on the narrow ground that the enabling act did
not provide for those reasons as a basis of subdivision control. This problem has
been especially acute during the period since World War II with the shift of urban
population to the more rural areas of the larger municipalities, or to the smaller out-
lying communities. The community is faced with increased costs in maintaining
schools and other public services. To offset this expenditure it must rely on the
tax base of the property which is developed as a result of this shift in population
and on the tax base of existing property. The former tax base should be at its
optimum and the latter preserved. Haphazard development in the process of the
community's growth may well result in neither and in unduly large expenditures.
Land use restrictions are the community planner's primary tools with which he at-
tempts to maintain this local economy.
Land use restrictions have been upheld as measures within the scope of the police
power.2 The traditional concept of this power is that the state may impose reasonable
restrictions upon individual freedom for the benefit of public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare. While the concept has not been given a static definition, it
has been carefully circumscribed by the courts However, during the last half
century the courts have tended to add "general prosperity" to the usual phrases
mentioned. The Supreme Court of the United States stated, "We hold that the
police power of a State embraces regulations designed to promote the public con-
venience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the
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public health, the public morals or the public safety."4 Since then many state courts
in reviewing or adjudicating rights involving land use restrictions have declared
general prosperity to be within the scope of police power.0 In Wisconsin the court
said that "If such regulations stabilize the value of property, promote the permanency
of desirable home surroundings, and if they add to the happiness and comfort of the
citizens, they thereby promote the general welfare."'  The New York Court of
Appeals in Wulfsohn v. Burden7 was also among the first state courts to follow the
federal expansion of police power. That court stated that "Changing economic con-
ditions . . . may make necessary or beneficial . . . public regulation."' However,
because an objective may in principle justify the exercise of police power does not
mean that the methods used are proper in a given case-the regulation, in the field
of land use restrictions, must be reasonable as applied to the property which is re-
stricted. This paper will be focused on the question of the extent to which com-
munities may utilize the police power to ease the financial burdens which result
from the shift in population.
ZONING
In its earlier years zoning was hailed for its effect in stabilizing and even in-
creasing property values.j' However, this acclamation died as the method was used,
and finally people working in the field admitted it to have a negligible effect in
terms of finance, except perhaps at the most highly restricted residential level."
The explanation for the former view may be that at the time one could generally
perceive little more than the initial impact of zoning with which some change or
arrest might be expected. But this impact could have little predictive value as to
how zoning would operate in this country over a period of time.
The courts have been of little help to the planner in his attempt to bring zoning
to the aid of the municipal coffers. Attempts to use it to economize municipal ex-
penditures were defeated by early New Jersey decisions such as Ingersoll v. Village of
South Orange.'2 These cases consistently held that inability to supply such public
' Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 2oo U.S. 561, 592 (x9o6). See Bacon
v. Walker, 204 U.S. 3!1, 317 (1907).
' See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 Pac.
381, 383 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927); Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City
of New Haven, X32 Conn. 537, 539, 45 A.2d 828, 829 (1946); Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of
City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 415, 88 A.2d 607, 611 (1952); Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincin-
nati, 6o Ohio App. 443, 449, 21 N.E.2d 993, 997 (938).
'State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 158, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (1923).
7241 N.Y. 288, 15o N.E. i2o (1925).
8241 N.Y. at 299, 150 N.E. at 123. See Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120
N.J.L. 145, 198 Ad. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
' See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
"0 See LAWSON PURDY AND OTHERS, ZONING AS AN ELEMENT IN CITY PLANNING, AND FOR PROTECTION
OF PROPERTY VALUES, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 7, 39, 43 (1920).
" See Feiss, Zoning as a Positive Instrument of Planning, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PLANNING 275,
276-77 (A.S.P.O. 1946).
123 N.J. Misc. 335, 128 Atl. 393 (Sup. CL), aff'd, 1o2 N.J.L. 218, 13o Atl. 721 (1925). See
Karke Realty Associates v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 104 N.J.L. 173, 139 Ad. 55 (1927);
E. & M. Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Newark, 4 N.J. Misc. 467, 133 Atl. 413 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
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services as fire-fighting equipment and personnel was no ground for zoning re-
strictions; the city had a duty to furnish the services as it expanded. These de-
cisions seemed to have influenced other jurisdictions' 3 However, even at that time
they were considered not to impose an unlimited duty on the city to supply fire
protection for any amount of fire hazard that a landowner might create, 4 and the
building code was to some extent effective in securing protection from fire hazards
1 5
An indirect effect of fire hazard prevention is reduction of municipal expense, but
the action is justified on grounds of public safety.
Even after the amendment to the New Jersey Constitution in 1927 validating
zoning, the Ingersoll case was cited with approval,:' thus indicating that finances
did not come within the scope of police power. Zoning would be a relatively in-
effectual tool for planners if these early decisions were rigidly adhered to and the
municipality were required to justify ordinances on a narrow view of public health,
safety, morals, and welfare. Later decisions seem to have recognized this and have
begun to indicate that "physical, economic, and social" conditions are proper factors
to be considered in determining the most appropriate use of property and justifying
the exclusion of industry from residential communities. 17 However, the scope of
consideration given to the economic factors appears limited in New Jersey by De Mott
Homes at Salem, Inc. v. Margate City.3 There the court held invalid an amend-
ment to a zoning ordinance restricting the plaintiff's property to single family dwell-
ings, on a finding that the motivation behind the ordinance was fear of increased
burdens on schools and public services with insufficient return in the form of taxes
from the plaintiff's land to meet the expenditures.' 9 The case, however, has been
distinguished as involving spot zoning discriminating against the property owner20
Perhaps the clearest declaration by the New Jersey courts is found in Springfield Tp.
v. Bensley2l where the proposition found in the early Ingersoll case was reiterated
with vigor. The court said that it was "not concerned with the economics in-
volved in the performance of the duty resting on the municipal authorities to
Michel v. Village of South Orange, 4 N.J. Misc. 302, 132 At. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Rudensey v. Board
of Adjustment of Town of Montclair, 4 N.J. Misc. 103, 135 At. 9o6 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Eaton v. Village
of South Orange, 3 N.J. Misc. 956, 13o At. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
"See City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Building Co., Ii2 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
4 Caldwell v. Saul, 5 N.J. Misc. 165, 135 Ad. 691 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
"See, e.g., Harrison v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Montclair, 6 N.J. Misc. 570, 142 Atl.
353 (Sup. Cr. 1928); Contras v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 5 N.J. Misc. 59, 135 Ad. 472 (Sup.
Ct. 1926).
"GHirschorn v. Castles, r13 N.J.L. 277, 174 Ad. 2s (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"'Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, i N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (s949). See
Matter of Fox Meadow Estates, Inc. v. Culley, 233 App. Div. 250, 252 N.Y. Supp. 178 (ad Dep't 1931),
afl'd, 261 N.Y. 5o6, 185 N.E. 714 (1933).
18 136 N.J.L. 330, 56 A.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aft'd, 136 N.J.L. 639, 57 A.ad 388 (1948).
20 136 N.J.L. at 334, 56 A.2d at 426.
" Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, ii N.J. Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1952).
Ridgefield Terrace Realty Co. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 136 N.J.L. 31X, 55 A.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
was distinguished on the same grounds in Guaclides. In the Ridgefield case the court refuted the com-
munity's argument that the proposed apartment houses would overtax the schools and other public
services.
21 19 N.J. Super. 147, 88 A.2d 271 (Ch. i952).
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furnish required facilities as and when and to the extent needed. The duty is
paramount."22 Weight given to economic factors has not invalidated zoning ordi-
nances where the ordinance may be justified on other grounds, 23 or rendered illegal
action denying an application for a variance.24
Most enabling acts have a provision similar to that found in the New Jersey
statute which requires that zoning regulations be made "with a view of conserving
the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land. ....25
This provision is relied upon by cases permitting some consideration of economic
factors. It would aid the planner at least to the extent that zoning for the most
appropriate use of property and enforcing a uniform use for the particular neighbor-
hood is effective in decreasing the loss of property value and thus maintaining the
tax base. The grant of power is a negative one, however, for courts have held in-
valid attempts to use it to enhance the value of property and in that way to increase
revenue.26 One could have little quarrel with this result as a matter of statutory
construction. If the enabling act expressly provided for the enhancement of value
there is some language indicating that zoning regulations enacted pursuant to the
provision might be sustained.27 However, even then the regulation must pass the
test of reasonableness. to be upheld as a valid exercise of police power. Use of
zoning to set up minimum values for buildings28 or to maintain a low tax rate
or to exclude the conservative spender from the community2" has not been en-
couraged by the courts.
Those jurisdictions refusing to sustain zoning ordinances based upon economic
considerations might rule differently under the Illinois enabling act which empowers
municipalities to zone "To the end ... that the taxable value of land and buildings
throughout the municipality may be conserved .... "30  The statute further provides
that in enacting all ordinances "due allowance shall be made for existing conditions,
22 ig N.J. Super. at 158, 88 A.2d at 277.
2 5 Greenway Homes v. Borough of River Edge, 137 N.J.L. 453, 6o A.2d 8x1 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Putney
v. Township of Abington, 176 Pa. Super. 463, xo8 A.2d 134 ('954).
" See Shipman v. Town of Montclair, x6 N.J. Super. 365, 370, 84 A.2d 652, 654 (App. Div. 1951).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. §40: 55-32 (1940). See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Crr" LAw §20(25); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 5.2932 (949).
28 122 Main Street Corp. v. City of Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949); Brown v.
Board of Appeals of City of Springfield, 327 111. 644, 59 N.E. 225 (927).
"
7 See Putney v. Township of Abington, supra note 23, at xo8 A.2d at 138. The Alaska enabling
act provides that the regulations be made with a view to enhancing the value of property. ALASKA
CoMp. LAws ANN. § 26-r-35 (1949).
"See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. R1v. o5,
1055 (0953).
"9 See Simon v. Town of Needham, 312 Mass. 56o, 565-66, 42 N.E.2d 5x6, 5x9 (1942). But see
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 1r5, 96 N.E.2d 731 (295i). The court there upheld an
amendment to the zoning ordinance, the enactment of which was motivated by a finding of need for
housing and a desire to relieve the tax burden of the small home owner.
"ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 24, § 73-I (Supp. 1954). See Gill, Minimum Height Restrictions in Brock-
ton, in MUNcsipALtrns AND THE LAW IN ACToN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1946 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
TmE NATIONAL INsnTtTrE OF MUNICiPAL LAW OFFICERS 250, 255 (Rhyne ed. 2947). He suggests that
under this provision there is more likelihood of the courts' sustaining minimum height restrictions. But
see Brown v. Board of Appeals of City of Springfield, 327 Ill. 644, 259 N.E. 225 (1927).
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the conservation of property values, the direction of building development to the
best advantage of the entire municipality and the uses to which the property is de-
voted at the time of the enactment of such an ordinance."' Again it is to be
noted that the statute provides for the conservation and not the enhancement of
value. The Illinois Supreme Court has given effect to the provision that conservation
of the aggregate taxable value of property in the community is a goal of zoning. The
provision seems intended for the benefit of the municipal unit. The court sustained
a zoning ordinance under which the attacking owner's property was worth 50 per
cent less than it would have been under the use to which the owner sought per-
mission to change it.3 In that case the city introduced evidence to the effect
that loss in value of the neighboring property and thus of tax revenue to the city
would outweigh any possible gain to the attacking property owner. The petitions of
neighboring residential property owners that the use be allowed were held not to alter
the case. In fact, the court has stated that preventing loss of taxable value alone
would be sufficient basis for an ordinance 3 The provision that in enacting all
ordinances due allowance be made to conservation of property values would seem
intended for the benefit of individual property owners. The court has recognized
the right of the individual by holding invalid an amendment to a zoning ordinance
upon a showing by owners of property adjacent to the rezoned district that due
allowance was not made.' Such a distinction between the parties intended to be
benefited by the two provisions in the Illinois statute has the advantage of not im-
posing a strict duty upon the city of maintaining the taxable value of all property.
In view of possible conflict between the various purposes of zoning stated in enabling
acts, the municipality would seem to be in the best position to determine which
purpose is most beneficial to it at a given time. Some jurisdictions hold that the
economic consequences to the city flowing from a change to a less restrictive ordi-
nance involve questions of policy and business judgment committed to the "honest
judgment" of community officials0 5
Enabling acts containing only the provision that zoning regulations be made
with a view of conserving property values leave vague standards for determining
the identity of the party intended to be benefited. The community may prevail over
the property owner in causing a loss of property value so long as the end is within
the scope of the police power and reasonable. A landowner is protected by the fact
that the conservation of his property value is usually to the benefit of the municipal
"~ ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 24, § 73-I (Supp. 1954)-
"Dunlap v. City of Woodstock, 405 Ill. 410, 91 N.E.2d 434 (195o). The same provision of the
statute was held to negate a showing that a single family residence zoning ordinance was unreasonable
as to plaintiff's property when the defendant city introduced evidence that the use of plaintiff's property
as a multi-family residence would depreciate neighboring property value and diminish tax revenue. Jacob-
son v. Village of Wilmette, 403 Ill. 250, 85 N.E.2d 753 (949).
3"Neef v. City of Springfield, 38o Ill. 275, 281, 43 N.E.2d 947, 950 (1942). The plaintiff property
owner attempted to have zoning of his property changed from residential to allow construction of a
gasoline station. There were other grounds on which the ordinance could have been sustained.
Michigan-Lake Building Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930).
a Hendlin v. Fairmount Const. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 310, 72 A.2d 541 (Ch. 1950).
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budget. The taxable revenue to be derived from the property is in direct proportion
to the value of the property. However, a particular landowner would not be pro-
tected if a city empowered to zone with a view to raising revenue does so by ex-
tending a manufacturing district in such a way that residences in a neighboring
residential district depreciate in value. A zoning change from residential to in-
dustrial has been sustained where it was found that a buffer area prevented deprecia-
tion of residential property, that the land changed could not economically be used
as residential property, and that there was a comprehensive plan. The court stressed
the resulting tax benefit to the town and the smaller demand for schools and public
services than would have been created had a residential development been fostered. 0
However, where there would be depreciation of nearby residential property and
the owner of the rezoned property could have economically continued the original
use, it is doubtful that fiscal considerations alone would have justified the re-
zoning3
Municipalities have recently found some aid in combating haphazard growth of
their fringe areas in minimum lot size and minimum floor area restrictions. The
former is perhaps the more effective in terms of controlling rapid development of
particular districts and perhaps the one more often recognized by the courts. In
1942, the Massachusetts court upheld a minimum lot size requirement of one acre
for single family dwellings.3" There the court noted that "The expense that might
be incurred by a town in furnishing police and fire protection, the construction and
maintenance of public ways, schoolhouses, water mains and sewers and other public
conveniences might be considered as an element more or less incidently involved, in
the adoption of a zoning by-law that will promote the health, safety, convenience,
morals or welfare of the inhabitants of the town without imposing any unreasonable
and arbitrary burden upon the landowners."3" This would seem another indication
that although municipal finances alone may not serve as a basis for zoning re-
strictions, they may be considered as one of the factors in the over-all formulation of
zoning policy.4° The court indicated that this type of zoning could not be used
to maintain a low tax rate.4 ' Since then a minimum lot restriction as high as five
acres per residence has been upheld as furthering "the advancement of a community
as a social, economic and political unit . ,, ."42 The Missouri Supreme Court up-
"' Hills v. Zoning Commission of Town of Newington, 139 Conn. 603, 609, 96 A.2d 212, 215
(1953).
"See Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, 68 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1953). The court stated that stabiliza-
tion and enhancement of property values in a particular district would not in itself be sufficient to
justify the zoning ordinance.
"SSimon v. Town of Needham, 3I1 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516.
39 31x Mass. at 565, 42 N.E.2d at 519.
4 But see Appeal of Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n, 361 Pa. 322, 327-28, 64 A.2d 783, 785 (1949).
The court in overruling refusal of a variance from a 7500 square feet per family restriction stated that
fear of financial burdens in providing for maintenance of schools and police protection was not a con-
trolling consideration in the case.
"Simon v. Town of Needham, 35 Mass. at 566, 42 N.E.2d at 519.
"Fischer v. Bedminster Tp., ii N.J. 194, 203, 93 A.2d 378, 382 (1952). See Dilliard v. Village
of North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't 1950) (two acre minimum upheld;
MUNICIPAL ECONOMY AND LAND RESnUCTIONS 487
held a three acre minimum restriction where the attacking property owner's land
adjoined land in other villages zoned for similar lot sizes 3 The city defended the
ordinance on the ground that smaller lot sizes would cause an increase in population
which would unbalance the plan for schools, improvements, and fire and police
protection to be made in accordance with zoning recommended by city planners4
In view of these facts the court thought that the exclusion of the plaintiffs prop-
erty from the ordinance would disrupt the general zoning planned for the benefit
of the community.
Minimum lot size zoning can be sustained as a regulation of population density
when done in accordance with a comprehensive plan-a purpose common to most
enabling acts.40 These ordinances imposing minimum lot sizes of one to two
acres are fairly easily justified on grounds of public health, safety, and general wel-
fare. Because of this some cities have used the device to prevent overcrowded de-
velopments yielding insufficient tax return for the services which would have to be
supplied, where the city would not be able to justify zoning on the grounds of
municipal economy." However, in using this device to control future develop-
ment the community must be prepared to show that the time of anticipated residential
use of the land can be fixed with some degree of certainty and that the property is
suitable for the use zoned. Otherwise the ordinance may well be struck down as an
unreasonable restriction.4 7 This consideration may cause doubt as to the propriety
of highly restrictive zoning at fringe areas of the community, where to the present
time little development has taken place. Development at the fringe areas still at
great distances from previously built-up sections of the community would not seem
to alter the problem greatly when the community attempts to zone under the tra-
ditional concept of police power. However, if police power were held to include
protection of municipal finances the problem might be to some extent eliminated.
The city might be able to show that regulation has a more substantial relationship
to the municipal economy than it would have to the traditional concepts of police
power.
Minimum floor area restrictions were upheld by the New Jersey court in Lions-
head Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne s The court noted that without this type
of restriction there would be danger of the lakes in the area attracting summer
visitors who would erect buildings of such inferior quality that the general value
however, here the plaintiff had purchased the property with knowledge of the ordinance and had sold
4 of the 48 acres for more than half the purchase price). In Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, i99
Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 195o), the court upheld an amendment changing the minimum
restriction from 2o,ooo square feet to 40,000 square feet per dwelling.
"'Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952).
4" 362 Mo. at a036-37, 246 S.W.2d at 776.
"E.g., ME. REv. STAT. c. 91, §93 (1954).
"C Interviews with city planning officials.
"TSee Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938); Forde v.
City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642 (i941).
48 to N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
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of property would decrease and result in large loss to the permanent residents of the
area.49 This type of zoning has not met with the same extent of judicial approval as
have minimum lot size restrictions.5" In Medinger Appeal"' the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court recendy said "We therefore hold that neither aesthetic reasons nor the
conservation of property values or the stabilization of economic values in a town-
ship are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the morals or the
safety or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property owners
within the meaning of the enabling Act of i93i, as amended, or under the Consti-
tution of Pennsylvania."5  Although the Pennsylvania enabling act does not spe-
cifically provide for preservation of property value, it does authorize regulation and
restriction of building size and height as well as of density of population "For the
purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of town-
ships. . . .", If the court had not been disposed to construe zoning legislation
stricdy, it might be argued that conservation of property value is an element of "the
general welfare."54
While minimum floor area restrictions have the advantage of not being subject
to the objection that a landowner is deprived of his right to build because his lot
size is too small,55 they have been attacked as economic segregation and as designed
for the purpose of protecting high cost buildings.56 The attack has been countered
with the suggestion that one should not be shocked by this fact because zoning in
many cases results in ecomonic segregation. An example offered is the economic
hardship imposed on property owners who would derive income from their houses
if they were zoned multi-family rather than single residence or if zoning allowed a
store in part of their homes.57  Once it is established that preservation of property
values is a proper basis of zoning, it would seem that the next question is whether
the particular restriction imposed is related to that purpose and whether the exercise
of the power in a given case is reasonably calculated to effect that goal."" If a
district has developed to some extent with high cost houses, zoning with minimum
9 o N.J. at 175, 89 A.2d at 698.
"See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REv. o51,
1059 (1953) and cases there cited.
51 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d at 158 (19.54).
52 377 Pa. at 226, 104 A.2d 122.
"PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 53, §19092-3101 (Supp. 1953).
"See Schloemer v. City of Louisville, 298 Ky. 286, 289, x82 SAV.2d 782, 784 (i944). The court
said that preventing a decrease in the value of neighboring property was directly related to public
welfare. The Kentucky enabling act, however, did provide that zoning be done with a view of con-
serving property value. Ky. REv. STrAT. ANN. §soo.o66 (i943).
" See Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 U. ILL. LAW FoRum
186, X97.
"See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. Ri.v. 1o51
(1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-ln Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 986 (1954).
Professor Haar is of the opinion that sliding scale minimum floor areas for different districts tailored to
various land uses smack even more of economic segregation. He notes that the Pennsylvania court
recognizes that here health justification is no longer present, for it is difficult to say that one size house
is healthy in one district and detrimental to health in another. 66 HAnv. L. Rzv. at io56-57.
"See Babcock, supra note 55, at 201.
"See Babcock, supra note 55, at 202.
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floor area restrictions would tend to cause houses built at a later date to be on a par
or closely approximate in value the original houses. But in an area already quite
fully developed and with few vacant lots a minimum floor area requirement for
future homes requiring, as a practical matter, buildings highly disproportionate in cost
to surrounding buildings may well be struck down as unreasonable. The basic as-
sumption in this area seems to be that the cluster of low cost houses that might be
developed were it not for these restrictions would create a financial burden on the
community not reimbursed in the form of taxes to a far greater extent than would
large, less densely packed homesY9 However, it is possible that the former type
development would attract the lower income groups who because of their financial
condition are more likely to remain in and patronize that area. If this is true, an
interesting question arises as to whether this increased local business compensates
for the smaller tax return from the property.
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
Another approach to the control of haphazard development is through sub-
division control. Under this system of control, enabling acts provide that planning
boards may adopt an official plan or map of the community." The planning board
may be authorized to approve or disapprove or modify plats of proposed sub-
divisions.l Plats submitted for approval should, where an official plan has been
adopted, be co-ordinated with that plan "so as to compose a convenient system con-
forming to the official map and properly related to the proposals shown by the
planning board on the master plan. .. ."6" Where these statutes provide for master
plans, municipal authorities should follow the statutory steps in adopting the plan if
they wish to rely upon it in disapproving plats for improperly placed roads. 3 Also
if the enabling statute provides that regulations are to be adopted for the purpose of
regulating subdivisions, the planning body must not mix its legislative and admin-
istrative functions6
Some enabling statutes provide that, prior to approval, the planning board may
require such things as the following: streets sufficiently wide for prospective traffic
and for access for fire-fighting equipment, graded, paved, and provided with curbs
and gutters; and water mains, sanitary sewers, and storm drains or combined sewers
installed in accordance with standards set up by the appropriate municipal depart-
ment.65 The statute may provide that this be done at the expense of the subdivider
or that the community do it with the subdivider furnishing a performance bond.66
"°There was some evidence to this effect in Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 565, 42
N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942).
"
0 N.Y. TowN LAW §272-a. See §§270, 273.
61 N.Y. TowN LAW §276. 2N.Y. TowN LAW §277.
a' E.g., Lordship Park Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford, 137 Conn. 84, 75
A.2d 379 (1950). Where there is no official map the statute may provide that the proposed roads be
properly related to the existing street system. See N.J. STAr. ANN. § 40:55-1.20 (Supp. 1954)-
" See Beach v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Milford, supra note i.
0 5 E.g., N.Y. TowN LAW §277. The planning board may waive these requirements if in the interest
of public health, safety, and general welfare.0 0 Ibid.
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Where a court finds that a master plan has been adopted, conditions placed on plat
approval such as dedication of land for streets of greater width than existing public
streets have been upheld as well as conditions requiring dedication of land for
trees and shrubbery.6" Some enabling acts provide that a subdivider may place a
notation on his plat when submitted for recording that the streets are not to be con-
sidered public. The streets in such a case remain private until formally offered to
and accepted by the public or until they are taken by eminent domain.' However,
pressure for an offer to the public is imposed by a provision that no public municipal
street utility be constructed on any street until it is public and placed on the official
map, unless it is a subsurface utility operated for revenue0 9
Subdivision controls seem aimed at preventing a property owner from realizing
a profit at the expense of the community to the extent that he must provide for the
initial cost of laying streets and public services such as water and sewerage. How-
ever, little of this aids in controlling population density or the number of residences
that may be a continuing burden on the community in terms of maintaining the
services. It is here that the relationship between subdivision control and such
zoning restrictions as minimum lot size requirements comes into play. Statutes
authorizing subdivision control may provide that the plat conform to the zoning
regulations in force ° or that minimum lot sizes be specified in the subdivision
ordinance.7 Land use restrictions would be of aid to the community in this sit-
uation only in so far as the activity sought to be controlled takes place within
its jurisdiction. Thus where an enabling statute allows the community to zone or
control subdivision only to its border there is nothing the community can do to
prevent a property owner outside that area from subdividing land with complete
disregard for the future consequences of his action. There may be some relief
against this danger in a jurisdiction giving the community power to annex sur-
rounding property on a showing of necessity.12 In such a case the community would
not necessarily be bound by a negative vote of the electorate in the district to be
annexed and thus would seem to possess a greater freedom of action. The problem
may also be alleviated to some extent by such statutes as that in Illinois giving the
community jurisdiction to prepare plans and control subdivision in the contiguous
territory one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits. 7a  However, where
enabling acts give cities, counties, towns, and villages power to adopt zoning regula-
tions and subdivision control, the town may be limited to its area outside that of an
incorporated village or city."4 There may be a problem here of a conflict between
"
7 Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d x (1949). If there
is no master plan or official plan the New Jersey statute provides that no greater width than 5o feet
be required. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.20 (Supp. 1954).
"6 See N.Y. TowN LAW §278.
"N.Y. Towx LAW §280.
oE.g., N.Y. TowN LAw §277.
"'N.J. STAT. ANN. §40:55-1.15 (Supp. 1954).
5
"See Norfolk County v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
"'ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, §53.2 (1942).
"' See N.Y. TowN LAW T§26r, 276.
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the standards of, say, a town and a city. Where the town's standards are lower
than those of the city, subdivision taking place under the town's standards may
work to the detriment of the city upon subsequent annexation.
In as much as zoning and subdivision control are both accomplished by the
exercise of police power, it would seem that the considerations applicable to the
former would also apply to the latter. However, some jurisdictions regard recorda-
tion of the subdivision plat a privilege and allow a community to impose reasonable
conditions before the privilege is granted.7 5 Under such reasoning the community
may be able to exercise more control than would be possible under the traditional
doctrine of police power.
CONCLUSION
There is a great area of uncertainty as to the extent communities may consider
financial burdens in formulating zoning or subdivision policy. Most cases indicate
that it may be considered as part of the over-all picture. Indeed, its consideration
does not invalidate the action when there exists adequate justification on other
grounds. Active use of land use restrictions to increase revenue would seem to be
invalid absent a provision in the enabling act, except in practical effect where mini-
mum floor area regulation has been upheld.70 It has been suggested that the proper
justifications for minimum standards in zoning are not the traditional subjects of
police power, but rather preservation of property value and hence conservation of
tax base.77 Attempts to attain this objective may be enhanced by provisions in the
enabling statute, such as that of Illinois, that preservation of "taxable value" is a pur-
pose of zoning. Once public economy is acknowledged as a justification for the
exercise of police power, the means of control would seem to be through preservation
of property value. In such a case it is difficult to see how an attack that existing
investments are being protected can succeed. When an individual or a particular
group of people is protected at the expense of the remainder of the community the
attack might be sustained, for the police power is being used to discriminate among
"nSee Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 2,7 N.W. 58 (1928); Carter, J. dis-
senting in Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 43, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (1949).
" The Georgia enabling act provides that the regulations "be made in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan designed for the purposes, among others, of . . . encouraging such distribution . . . of land
development and utilization as will tend to facilitate economic and adequate provisions for transporta-
tion, communications, roads, airports, water supply, drainage, sanitation, education, recreation or other
public requirements. . . . Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
others, to . . . securing economy in governmental expenditures. GA. CODE ANN. §69-802 (Supp.
X951).
7 Babcock, supra note 55, at 2o1. See Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal
Sanctions, 17 A.B.A.J. 163 (931). At page x65 Mr. Landels states that "On analysis the primary
objects of zoning are found to be . . . the protection of the value . . . of urban land, and the assurance
of such orderliness in municipal growth as will facilitate the execution of the city plan and the eco-
nomical provision of public services."
In the course of interviews with city planning officials the writer was made aware of the fact that
although exclusion of multi-family dwellings from single family zones is justified as a means of securing
protection of health and fire safety, the planning officials are primarily concerned with the reduced
municipal expenditures and increased tax return involved when the community decreases the number
of multi-family dwellings in favor of more single family residences.
492 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
members of the community. The exercise of police power should be held to the
constitutional test of reasonableness when used to protect municipal finances as it is
when used for the traditional subjects of police power. However, absent that factor,
preservation of taxable value would seem different from the other concepts for here
what is good for the community will on the whole be good for the property owner.
Once given the power to regulate in this manner the community almost has to pro-
tect the property owner.
Preservation of taxable value as a justification will produce results raising at least
two related problems. One is that pronounced economic segregation will be a
practical effect. It would seem that sliding scale minimum floor area zoning
would be valid if it need no longer be justified on grounds of health. In such a
case the income groups will be forced to seek the district which allows the size house
they are financially able to afford. A single minimum floor area requirement for the
community may force low income groups to migrate to other areas where they may
be faced with the same situation or the second area may be forced to adopt similar
measures to prevent a sudden influx of people. This raises the question of the
unit which is to be used in zoning7 Focusing solely on local conditions may pro-
duce detrimental effects in the surrounding areas that will have repercussions at some
future time. The problem may also arise from situations in which communities
zoned purely residential rely on neighboring communities for such things as stores
and schools79 While the neighboring communities will benefit from the increased
business, they will also be educating children for whom there will be no reimburse-
ment in the form of taxes. Even if the schools receive tuition for these children
there remains inconvenience in the arrangement. Perhaps some sort of regional
unit should be adopted with less stress by the courts on the local aspect.
"8See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REv. io5,
1053 (I953).
"See Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
